Friday, February 13, 2009

American Armageddon or McCain

American Armageddon: How the Delusions of the Neoconservatives and the Christian Right Triggered the Descent of America - and Still Imperil Our Future

Author: Craig Unger

The presidency of George W. Bush has led to the worst foreign policy decision in the history of the United States -- the bloody, unwinnable war in Iraq. How did this happen? Bush's fateful decision was rooted in events that began decades ago, and until now this story has never been fully told.
From Craig Unger, the author of the bestseller House of Bush, House of Saud, comes a comprehensive, deeply sourced, and chilling account of the secret relationship between neoconservative policy makers and the Christian Right, and how they assaulted the most vital safeguards of America's constitutional democracy while pushing the country into the catastrophic quagmire in the Middle East that is getting worse day by day.
Among the powerful revelations in this book:

  • Why George W. Bush ignored the sage advice of his father, George H.W. Bush, and took America into war.
  • How Bush was convinced he was doing God's will.
  • How Vice President Dick Cheney manipulated George W. Bush, disabled his enemies within the administration, and relentlessly pressed for an attack on Iraq.
  • Which veteran government official, with the assent of the president's father, protested passionately that the Bush administration was making a catastrophic mistake -- and was ignored.
  • How information from forged documents that had already been discredited fourteen times by various intelligence agencies found its way into President Bush's State of the Union address in which he made the case for war with Iraq.
  • How Cheney and the neocons assembled a shadow national security apparatus and created a disinformation pipeline to mislead Americaand start the war.

A seasoned, award-winning investigative reporter connected to many back-channel political and intelligence sources, Craig Unger knows how to get the big story -- and this one is his most explosive yet. Through scores of interviews with figures in the Christian Right, the neoconservative movement, the Bush administration, and sources close to the Bush family, as well as intelligence agents in the CIA, the Pentagon, and Israel, Unger shows how the Bush administration's certainty that it could bend history to its will has carried America into the disastrous war in Iraq, dooming Bush's presidency to failure and costing America thousands of lives and trillions of dollars. Far from ensuring our security, the Iraq War will be seen as a great strategic pivot point in history that could ignite wider war in the Middle East, particularly in Iran.
Provocative, timely, and disturbing, The Fall of the House of Bush stands as the most comprehensive and dramatic account of how and why George W. Bush took America to war in Iraq.



Go to: Apprendimento informale: Riscoprendo le vie naturali che ispirano l'innovazione e la prestazione

McCain: The Myth of a Maverick

Author: Matt Welch

John McCain is one of the most familiar, sympathetic, and overexposed figures in American politics, yet his concrete governing philosophy and actual track record have been left curiously unexamined, mostly because of the massive distractions in his official biography, but also because of his ingenious strategy of talking ad infinitum to each and every access-craving media person who happens by. The more he has spouted, the less journalists have bothered trying to see through the fog.

        McCain gives the voting public what it wants but can’t find -- a flesh-and-bones political portrait of a man onto whom people are forever projecting their own ideological fantasies. It is a psychological key for decoding his allegedly ‘maverick’ actions, and the first realistic assessment of what a John McCain presidency may look like. McCain will quickly lay out in overlapping detail the root cause of the senator’s worldview: his personal transformation from underachieving punk to war hawk uber-patriot, in which he used the "higher power" of American nationalism to save his life and soul.

        As McCain wrenches himself inside-out in pursuit of the prize that eluded him in 2000, McCain will look behind the war hero, behind the maverick reformer. Journalist and pundit Matt Welch brings to this project an investigative eye and a coolly analytical mindset to provide Republicans, Democrats and Independents a picture of the man in full before they enter the voting booth in 2008.
 



Thursday, February 12, 2009

For the Soul of Mankind or Rethinking American History in a Global Age

For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War

Author: Melvyn P Leffler

“A highly relevant and much-needed historical study . . . One of the best books on the period to have been written.” —The Economist

To the amazement of the public, pundits, and even the policymakers themselves, the ideological and political conflict that endangered the world for half a century came to an end in 1990. How did that happen? What had caused the cold war in the first place, and why did it last as long as it did? To answer these questions, Melvyn P. Leffler homes in on four crucial episodes when American and Soviet leaders considered modulating, avoiding, or ending hostilities and asks why they failed. He then illuminates how Reagan, Bush, and, above all, Gorbachev finally extricated themselves from the policies and mind-sets that had imprisoned their predecessors, and were able to reconfigure Soviet-American relations after decades of confrontation.

The Washington Post - Richard Rhodes

He tells a good story. Leffler explains in his introduction that For the Soul of Mankind is a narrative of five momentous Cold War episodes rather than a full history. The first episode, about Stalin, Truman and the origins of the Cold War, feels perfunctory—Leffler published an excellent book on the subject, The Preponderance of Power, in 1992. But the University of Virginia historian finds his voice in energetic examinations of the promising turmoil in the Politburo following Stalin's death in 1953, the near-Armageddon of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the erosion of detente in the Carter years and the end of the Cold War at the hands of Gorbachev, Reagan and George H. W. Bush.

Publishers Weekly

Drawing on extensive research in American and Soviet archives, Bancroft Prize-winner Leffler (A Preponderance of Power) offers a scintillating account of the forces that constrained Soviet and American leaders in the second half of the 20th century. Leffler begins by admitting that he was shocked by the rapid demise of communism. If Reagan and Gorbachev could end the Cold War, why hadn't earlier leaders been able to do so? To answer that question, Leffler examines five crucial moments when Washington and Moscow "thought about avoiding or modulating the extreme tension" between them. At the end of WWII, Leffler says, Stalin thought that cooperation with the West might be preferable to entrenched hostility. Yet he and Truman were pressed by an "international order that engendered... fear" to make decisions that led to Cold War and shaped policy for decades. Leffler examines why Eisenhower and Malenkov couldn't wipe the slate clean after Stalin's death; how Khrushchev, Kennedy and Johnson reacted to the pressures of international allies and domestic political enemies; why détente foundered under Carter and Brezhnev, and what circumstances allowed leaders of the 1980s to focus on common interests rather than differences. Leffler has produced possibly the most readable and insightful study of the Cold War yet. 47 b&w illus., 6 maps. (Sept.)

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Kirkus Reviews

The Cold War began under murky and not entirely planned circumstances governed by individual personalities. So, writes Leffler (History/Univ. of Virginia; The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953, 1994, etc.), did it end, thanks to two personalities in particular. The U.S. and the Soviet Union made sometimes uncomfortable allies in the war against Hitler, but they were allies all the same. When that war ended, Leffler observes, there was a world to divide up; Stalin had his agenda, but so did Harry Truman, who demanded that America enjoy 85 percent of any given pie rather than a nice 50-50 split. Stalin took a dim view of that math; and in all events, when the U.S. announced that it would never again be caught napping or give up its military superiority, and that it would "hold the atomic bomb as a 'sacred trust' for all mankind," Stalin felt hemmed in, even blackmailed. Leffler does a creditable job of depicting the ensuing Cold War from the point of view of the Soviet leadership as well as from the already well-documented American one, and he turns up surprises: one, for instance, that the Soviet leadership, urged along by Lavrentiy Beria, was exploring the possibility of allowing German to reunify as a neutral power, a far better alternative in his mind than "a permanently unstable socialist Germany whose survival relied on the support of the Soviet Union." That plan went nowhere: Stalin died; Beria was executed; and another generation of East-West confrontation would ensue. Leffler's interest lies in the personalities of the leaders who enabled detente, and finally an end to the Cold War-foremost among them, in his assessment, MikhailGorbachev, who "made the most fundamental alterations in his own thinking" in order to accept a fundamental shift in the world's political order. (Reagan had something to do with it, too, writes Leffler. But Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev? Useless.)A well-balanced and illuminating history of the Cold War.



Table of Contents:
List of Illustrations     ix
List of Maps     xiii
Acknowledgments     xv
Introduction     3
The Origins of the Cold War, 1945-48: Stalin and Truman     11
Stalin the Revolutionary     11
Stalin in World War II     20
Truman     37
Stalin and Truman     48
International Anarchy     57
Politics at Home     70
Allies and Clients     75
Ideology, Personality, and the International System     79
The Chance for Peace, 1953-54: Malenkov and Eisenhower     84
Stalin's Death     84
Eisenhower's Response     95
Turmoil in the Kremlin     114
A Chance for Peace?     122
Arms Control, Germany, and Indochina     138
Fear and Power     147
Retreat from Armageddon, 1962-65: Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Johnson     151
At the Brink     151
Khrushchev's Retreat     158
Kennedy Bides His Time     174
Give Peace a Chance     182
Starting Anew and Ending Abruptly     192
Johnson's Agonies and Choices     201
From Armageddon Back to Cold War     224
The Erosion of Detente, 1975-80: Brezhnev and Carter     234
Brezhnev and Detente     234
A New Face in Washington, an Old One in Moscow     259
Clients, Hegemons, and Allies     273
The China Card     288
Iran and Afghanistan     299
The Vienna Summit     311
Nicaragua and Afghanistan     319
The End of Detente     334
The End of the Cold War, 1985-90: Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush     338
Morning in America     339
Twilight in Moscow     365
Arms Reductions     374
The Troops Come Out     403
New Thinking, Old Thinking     414
The Wall Comes Down     427
Two Countries Become One     439
Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush     448
Conclusion     451
Notes     469
Bibliography     545
Index     571

Books about: Introduction à l'Économétrie

Rethinking American History in a Global Age

Author: Thomas Bender

In rethinking and reframing the American national narrative in a wider context, the contributors to this volume ask questions about both nationalism and the discipline of history itself. The essays offer fresh ways of thinking about the traditional themes and periods of American history. By locating the study of American history in a transnational context, they examine the history of nation-making and the relation of the United States to other nations and to transnational developments. What is now called globalization is here placed in a historical context.
A cast of distinguished historians from the United States and abroad examines the historiographical implications of such a reframing and offers alternative interpretations of large questions of American history ranging from the era of European contact to democracy and reform, from environmental and economic development and migration experiences to issues of nationalism and identity. But the largest issue explored is basic to all histories: How does one understand, teach, and write a national history even as one recognizes that the territorial boundaries do not fully contain that history and that within that bounded territory the society is highly differentiated, marked by multiple solidarities and identities?
Rethinking American History in a Global Age advances an emerging but important conversation marked by divergent voices, many of which are represented here. The various essays explore big concepts and offer historical narratives that enrich the content and context of American history. The aim is to provide a history that more accurately reflects the dimensions of American experience and better connects the past withcontemporary concerns for American identity, structures of power, and world presence.